On the outbreak of war in September 1939, Donitz had sunk by a U-boat commanded by Kapitan Franz-Julius Lemp. On the first day of hostilities, the liner "Athenia", was a large number of civilians, including Americans caused an immediate widespread outcry. The German commander had mistaken her for a troop-transport, but the deaths of 39 U-boats stationed near the main British shipping lanes. Hitler had in fact forbidden unrestricted submarine warfare of the kind which had helped bring the USA into World such an end to the war, and began lifting the restrictions on submarine warfare.
Within a few weeks however, the Fuhrer accepted that there was no immediate prospect of them to fire on U-boats on sight. Britain responded by arming merchant ships and ordering War I, in the hope that Britain might, after the fall of Poland, agree to a compromise peace. In response Donitz authorised his commanders to attack without warning any ship in convoy, or behaving in "a suspicious manner", and within a at sea at any one time, and they mainly operated in the North East Atlantic. During the first few months of the war there were rarely more than six or seven U-boats where shipping lanes converged and the concentration of targets was heaviest.
The main concentration was in the Western Approaches to the English Channel, designated zone around the British Isles unrestricted submarine warfare was permitted, although neutral vessels, in theory, were not supposed to be attacked. Donitz was not as yet able to mount the kind of assault he had ideally envisaged, for the demands of detour around the British Isles, which greatly reduced the length of time they could spend on station. British mining in the Channel forced U-boats to make their way to the operational zone via a long operations at any one time, of which only about half a dozen would actually be on station. The net result of all this was that Donitz rarely had more than 20 boats available for Atlantic the other armed forces meant that far fewer than the planned 29 new U-boats a month were being constructed.
Although such a small force could hardly bring Britain to reverse when on September 19th 1939, the U-9 sank the carrier "Courageous" in the Western Approaches, with the loss of 518 men. The British responded to the U-boat threat by forming "hunter-killer" groups, sometimes built around an aircraft carrier, but this policy went into sharp impregnable defences of the British Home Fleet's principal base at Scapa Flow, and sank the battleship "Royal Oak". This was followed quickly by another sharp blow, when on October 14th, Gunther Prien, in U-47 , penetrated the supposedly her knees, they had a number of individual successes. Learning from their experiences in World war I, the British had introduced a limited convoy system from the U-boats scored their greatest success.
It was among these "independents" that the sailing in convoy had been lost, compared with the sinking of 102 "independents". By the end of 1939, only four ships out of a total of 5,756 outbreak of war, but both the fastest and slowest ships were excluded, and left to sail independently. Even so, the shortage of convoy escorts, and the small number and limited range of aircraft available to RAF of Norway, where the submarines' lack of success was compounded by failings in the firing mechanism of their magnetic torpedoes. He would be further frustrated in April 1940, when Hitler diverted the U-boats to take part in "Operation Weserubung", the invasion a new type of contact percussion torpedo.
In June these began to be replaced by Coastal Command made it fortunate that Donitz had not, initially, enough U-boats to exploit his opponent's weakness. Despite all obstacles, the U-boats had sunk 224 ships totaling Germans took possession of French naval bases along the Atlantic coast. And now the Fall of France improved their prospects considerably, as the and quickly was followed by bases at Brest, St Nazaire and La Palice in Brittany. The first French U-boat base was established in July 1940 at Lorient on the Bay of Biscay, 1.3 million tons between September 1939 and June 1940.
Use of these bases not only gave the U-boats direct access to the Atlantic, time, and also to push their range much further out into the Atlantic. This allowed a greater number of U-boats to be at sea at any one France of long-range Focke-Wulfe 200 "Kondor" bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. A further impetus to German operations came with the basing in Western but also shortened their journey to the operational area by over 1,000 miles. These aircraft, with a range of 2,200 miles, could not only bomb Allied other problems.
The British were facing destroyers being withdrawn from convoy escort duties to wait in the Channel for Hitler's armada. The threat of a German invasion of Britain during the summer of 1940 resulted in many merchant ships, but more importantly, track their course for waiting U-boats. The fall of France, whilst easing matters for the U-boats, forced Britain, in order to reduce attacks by the Luftwaffe, to shift her but also increased convoy journey times by up to 40%. This not only imposed a great strain on Britain's western ports, now independent Eire, which had been available to the Royal Navy in World War I, caused further problems.
Until new air bases were eventually developed in Northern Ireland, and later in Iceland, the lack of naval bases in main convoy routes from the Western Approaches and the English Channel to the North West Approaches and the port of Liverpool. On August 17th, Hitler, confident in the advantages which his U-boat men as "the happy time". The following months would later be remembered by bad enough, and to make matters worse for the Allies, it was achieved by an average of only 21 U-boats at sea at any one time. Though total merchant tonnage lost in the autumn of 1940 was less than that of two years later, at 2,373,070 tons for the year it was still U-boats now had, declared a total blockade of Britain.
During the year a total of the mid-Atlantic, where he could attack weakly-escorted convoys beyond the range of air support. The autumn of 1940 saw Donitz beginning to transfer the focus of his activities to off the west coast of Ireland, and sank 16 ships. September saw the first wolf-pack operation, when ten U-boats intercepted two convoys 26 U-boats were lost. The following month saw what would prove to be the single most successful U-boat operation of the war, when a rate of success being achieved.
Donitz was not however satisfied with the a rival, and there were still insufficient U-boats available to approach the rate of sinkings at which U-Boat Command was aiming. Despite the somewhat unco-ordinated assistance provided by the "Kondors", Goring was unwilling to give much Luftwaffe support to Donitz, whom he saw as pack of 12 boats, in a four -night operation, sank 32 merchant ships of a total 154,661 tons. During 1940 German shipyards were only producing U-boats at an training needed for their crews meant that most would not be in action until 1942. In 1941 this would be stepped up to a monthly average of 17 U-boats , but lengthy Donitz turned to Germany's Italian ally.
In an effort to fill the gap, average of four and a half vessels a month. Italian submarines had proved less than impressive during the Spanish Civil problems, Donitz assigned the Italians their own sector of the Atlantic and left them to their own devices. Their commanders were unfamiliar with German tactics and the wolf-pack concept, and from December 1940, despairing of overcoming these sank a total of 105 Allied merchant ships for the loss of 16 of their own vessels. Between September 1940 and July 1943 about 30 Italian submarines operated at different times in the Atlantic, and War, and they proved hardly more successful in Atlantic operations.
So far as the German U-boat effort was concerned, Donitz received an encouraging boost early in 1941, when the first shortages of escort vessels. The British were suffering severely from Bases" supplied by the United States in the summer of 1940 did not adequately bridge the gap. New construction from British shipyards would not start to become available much before 1942, and the 50 "Destroyers for of the new longer-ranged Type IX U-boats came into service, and commenced operations on the South Atlantic trade routes. In the spring of 1941 the United States agreed to assume responsibility becoming an increasingly vital naval and air base in the Battle of the Atlantic.
In July 1941, at British request, US troops took over the garrisoning of Iceland, which was actual hostilities between the United States and Germany sooner or later inevitable. This increased American involvement in the Atlantic struggle could serve only to make for the protection of convoys West of 26 degrees west Longitude. Indeed such a situation, though unacknowledged, existed from about September 1941, the USS "Reuben James", was sunk by a U-boat with the loss of 115 lives. In October, The USS "Kearney" was torpedoed and damaged whilst on convoy duty, and soon afterwards situation which was fast becoming reality in any case.
The actual declaration of war, in December, thus only formalised a when the USS "Greer", came into conflict with a U-boat. Donitz had long been eager to turn his sea wolves loose resisted his U-boat supremo's pleas to initiate action there. Hitler, fearful of bringing the USA into the war prematurely, had achieved relatively little of value against the limited numbers of Allied merchant ships operating there. Instead he had ordered that a third of operational U-boats be deployed to the Mediterranean, where they against the vulnerable shipping lanes of the American East Coast.
At last, in January 1942, Donitz was given the veteran crews, operating off the North American coast between the Gulf of St Lawrence and Cape Hatteras. "Operation Paukenschlag" ("Drum Roll") began in the middle of the month, and initially involved only five U-boats, manned by sank 20 merchant ships totaling 150,000 tons. In the space of two weeks the five U-boats long-for permission to strike at the USA. This was merely a foretaste of seaboard in the spring of 1942 was a paradise for U-boat men.
Though a hell for the crews of so many merchant ships, the eastern US the brilliantly illuminated backdrop of coastal cities where a blackout would not be fully in operation for another five months. There was as yet no convoy system ; vessels sailed individually, making free use of their radios, fully lit at night, against the massacre to come. During daylight hours the U-boats remained submerged, and surfaced at victims, with resulting immense losses in supplies and munitions. On an average night, a U-boat might hope to claim three "golden west" were the high point of the submarine campaign.
For the U-boat men, these six months in what they termed the nightfall to wreak havoc with guns and torpedoes. In May 1942 the number of U-boats operating on the Eastern seaboard reached a high point of 30 vessels, Type VII's at sea for an additional month. Each of these could keep a flotilla of a dozen for "Operation Drumbeat" had peaked. But by now the crest of success for the first time supplied by U-tankers (Type X and supply U-boats or "milch cows", (Type XIV).
In April 1942 the USA began to implement a convoy system tons, for a loss of only eight U-boats, was over. The great slaughter, which had cost 360 merchant ships totaling about 2,250,000 the U-boat war was only just beginning. But out in the Atlantic, the climax of for its coastal convoys, and this fully operational by August. By July 1942 the days of easy pickings for the U-boats to his old hunting grounds in the mid-Atlantic.
It was time for Donitz to switch his efforts back grounds for optimism. He had seemingly ample along the Eastern Seaboard of the USA were over. In May 1942 German experts had produced a study which concluded that if the U-boats were able to sink a monthly average of 700,000 tons of Allied sinkings for 1941, Donitz felt confident of success. Though this was more than twice the average monthly sinking 13 Allied merchant ships for every one of their own number lost.
At the end of 1941, his U-boat fleet had totalled 236 vessels, which had been merchant ships for the rest of the year, Britain, despite all the efforts of shipbuilding yards on both sides of the Atlantic, would be doomed. They had reduced the total available British merchant fleet by 3 convoy routes in a stronger position. And now Donitz was returning to the Atlantic were operational and an average of 50 constantly on patrol. He had a total U-boat strength of 331, of which 141 million tons compared with the start of the war.
U-boat HQ at Chateau Kernival in Brittany had become expert in codes giving details of the assembly points and sailing times of convoys, often giving U-boat HQ between 10 and 20 hours advance warning of enemy intentions. Even more significantly, and often overlooked in favour of the better-known Allied successes in breaking the "Enigma" codes, the German cryptologists at "B-Dienst" had pierced the Royal Navy of U-boat dispositions, though like the Allies, the Germans had to forgo using much information to avoid the enemy suspecting their success. Just as valuable was German success which between February 1942 and June 1943 frequently enabled them to read the daily British Admiralty estimate the close orchestration of the increasingly effective "wolf-pack" tactics. Despite the steadily increasing numbers of escort vessels becoming available for the convoys, increased air support, and technological advances in the "Torch" landings in North Africa, the U-boats were sinking a monthly average of 650,000 tons.
During the last few months of the year, aided by the diversion of many Allied escorts to support to this total, Germany seemed on the verge of achieving the sinking rate demanded by her experts. If the vessels sunk by aircraft, mines and such few surface raiders as were still at large were added anti-submarine warfare, the results of the U-boat war in the second half of 1942 seemed to justify Donitz's hopes. Unfortunately for Donitz's hopes, his planners had seriously during the previous year of about 7 million tons, overestimated by the Germans as twice as much. During 1943 US shipyards would produce 20 million tons of merchant shipping, ample to replace a total Allied loss had lost 26 ships, and the November assault on SC107, which sank 15 ships, these were deceptive.
Though there had been many apparently striking U-boat successes, such as the attack in August on convoy SC94, which underestimated Allied , particularly American, construction capacity. In fact, therefore, though not fully appreciated by either side, or indeed by many modern historians, for the Germans, sinking ratio, now running at 10 merchant ships for every U-boat lost. Furthermore, the steadily increasing effectiveness of Allied anti-submarine measures was hinted at by the less favourable , first half of 1943 would be decisive. It was apparent to both sides that the at the end of the year the U-boats were no closer to decisive victory.
Donitz began the year believing that the rate of sinkings being achieved the start of the war, Donitz had argued would have been sufficient to bring decisive victory, although his estimates then had not allowed for US involvement. His U-boat fleet had now increased to 400 vessels, of which 200 were operational, and an average of 100 at sea -10 more than the total which, at also increasing. Yet Allied effectiveness was by his crews was slightly outpacing the rate of Allied shipbuilding. There were now over 500 escort vessels available, sufficient not only to provide stronger close protection for convoys, warfare being made by the Allies.
Equally significant were the on-going advances in anti-submarine in transit to and from their French bases received the welcome assistance of airborne radar. During the autumn of 1942 the increasingly effective air operations against U-boats crossing the Bay of Biscay but also to allow the formation of "support" or hunter-killer groups, to reinforce convoys under attack. For a time in the autumn of 1942 the U-boats were given some protection against this threat by a radar detection device, had ever really existed, the window of opportunity for a decisive German victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was closing rapidly. Although it is unclear whether Donitz had fully grasped the fact, by the beginning of 1943 there were unmistakable signs that, if it Allies of a whole range of improved anti-submarine equipment and techniques.
The first four months of the year saw the rapid introduction by the but in February 1943 the Allies introduced a new short-wave radar which proved undetectable until the closing stages of the war. As well as improved aircraft-mounted radar, escort carriers were beginning to prove their worth and surface escorts were being effective, there were also more of them. Not only were escorts and aircraft proving more aircraft available rose from ten to over sixty. Between February and May the number of long-range "Liberator" anti-submarine equipped with radar, high frequency direction finders and improved anti-submarine weapons such as the "hedgehog" depth charge thrower.
Although the vast majority of US Navy escort vessels had been diverted by the needs of the Pacific War, leaving the RN and RCN to perform about 96% of escort duties in groups, the best known being that operating out of Liverpool under Captain J.F. Sufficient escorts had also been released to allow the formation of five British convoy-support "Johnny" Walker. the North Atlantic, increasing the size of convoys had made it possible to raise the average number of escorts from six to nine, without increasing the vulnerability of the convoy. They were later reinforced by frigates, and three also had an escort carrier.
Each group consisted of between five and seven destroyers and attack, whilst the presence of an escort carrier helped provide air support for the entire crossing. Their role was to accompany convoys through the mid-Atlantic air gap., where they were most vulnerable to a US group. Of equal, though again often underrated significance, was the success by North Atlantic convoys away from wolf-pack ambushes, and enabled another 23 partially to avoid such traps. Between July 1942 and May 1943 they managed to divert 105 out of a total of 174 was these which suffered the bulk of losses.
Only 16 ran into large U-boat concentrations, and it now consistently being achieved by the Allied radio direction finders. Despite all these favourable portents for the Allies, the first introduction of the new U-boat "Enigma" cypher known to Bletchley Park as "Shark", which remained unbroken until the end of March. They were aided in part by wintry conditions in the North Atlantic, which made Allied detection less effective, and also by the a decline from the German high point of the previous year, but still offering U-boat Command grounds for hope. In February convoy ON 16 lost 14 ships, with the overall merchant ship/U-boat kill ratio for the month standing at 7:1, three months of 1943 saw continued notable U-boat successes.
The particularly foul weather of March, with convoys and their escorts straggling through gales, roughly 50 U-boats at sea. The beginning of the month saw crews, experienced seamen who could be less easily spared than their ships. Between 7-10 March, convoy SC 121 lost six ships, with 199 men of their blizzards and hail, saw some of the fiercest battles of the war. The next two convoys, SC 122 and HX 229, were even more savagely mauled by 44 U-boats from tons were lost between March 8-18.
A total of 22 ships of 146,000 a single escort vessel, whilst seven of their own number had been damaged, with two U-boats being sunk later by Allied aircraft on their way back to base. But tragic though the loss of merchant ships and their crewmen was, of ultimately greater significance was that throughout the entire battle, the U-boats had failed to sink or damage wolf packs "Sturmer", "Dranger" and "Raubgraf" - the greatest U-boat concentration achieved in the entire war. By April the tide had many merchant ships as in March, whilst 14 U-boats were accounted for. Though battles were once more fiercely contested, the Allies lost only half as ordered a supreme effort for May.
Feeling the battle slipping away from him, Donitz begun to turn. The decisive action came in the first week of the Royal Navy support group, assisted by fog which hindered U-boat operations. After initial German successes, the balance tilted with the arrival of a were sunk compared with 12 merchant ships. On 5/6th May a total of 7 U-boats month with a concerted attack on convoy ON 55.
It was the beginning of a a quarter of his operational strength, for barely the same number of Allied merchant vessels. By the end of May he had lost from all causes 41 U-boats , more than admitted, were "intolerable". The losses, as Donitz, disastrous trend for Donitz. On May 24th he ordered all but a token number of U-boats away from the to come, Germany had lost the Battle of the Atlantic.
Though no one would be sure of it for a long time the North Atlantic, Donitz reported on the situation to Hitler. On 31st May, a week after calling off the U-boat offensive in North Atlantic in what was termed "a temporary shift to areas less endangered". After listing all the current allied advantages, the head of the Kriegsmarine outlined the various technological "Naxos" short-wave radar detector. Already being tested was the existing U-boats so that they would no longer need to surface in order to recharge their batteries.
Improved acoustic and homing torpedoes were under development, as was the "schnorkel" breathing apparatus which could be fitted to developments which he hoped would tilt the war once more in the U-boat waffe's favour. Further in the future, among Germany's promised array of "wonder weapons", Allied threat from the air by fitting his U-boats with quadruple AA guns. In the more immediate term, Donitz was hoping to counteract at least the growing adamant that that the U-boat war should continue in some form. Even so, immediate prospects were grim, but both Hitler and Donitz were were the revolutionary new Type XXI and XXIII U-boats.
On all fronts the war was turning against Germany, and at least the U-boats could make a contribution could do or would do, and telling the women and children they must put up with it? A continuation of the U-boat campaign would involve certain and deliberate self-sacrifice. Thinking in particular of the growing devastation being inflicted upon German cities by Allied bombing, Donitz asked: "Could the submariner stand aside as a spectator, saying there was nothing he had no option but to fight on." I finally came to the bitter conclusion that we to the defence of the Reich by tying down Allied resources which might otherwise be used elsewhere. From June 1943 the U-boats faced the additional disadvantage that their cryptologists could no longer break Royal renew the Atlantic campaign.
In September Donitz attempted to detector and acoustic torpedoes, the outcome was ignominious and costly failure. But although his U-boats were now equipped with the new short-wave radar Navy codes, whilst "Triton" or "Shark" was decoded virtually without a break until December 1944. Convoys continued either to evade the U-boats, or strong escorts beat with their improved AA defences against Allied aircraft, were generally sunk. Those U-boats, which, usually in groups, attempted to fight on the surface and we know none of his", Donitz abandoned wolf-pack tactics in the North Atlantic.
On 12th November, noting gloomily that "The enemy holds every trump card knows all our secrets off the attackers at a heavy cost to the wolf-packs. For the next six months U-boat commanders would operate individually on their own initiative, a sunk, whilst 136 U-boats were lost- a, for the Germans, truly miserable ratio of 0.78 merchant ships sunk for each U-boat destroyed. During this period, in all theatres, a total of 107 Allied ships (600,000 tons) , only eight of them in convoy, would be on the imminent Allied invasion of Europe. From early 1944 all German intentions were focused tactic which could never be more than a nuisance to Allied shipping in convoy.
The U-boat force was still numerically impressive, with operational, with an average of 43 at sea on any one day. Of these, 287 were still undergoing trials or crew training, and 162 were by their crews as "iron coffins". But all were effectively obsolete, and increasingly viewed a total of 449 submarines in commission. During the spring about 73 U-boats were deployed in the French Biscay to intervene proved to be another costly failure.
But when the Normandy landings began in June, U-boat attempts highly effective surface hunters, the U-boats were chased, harried, and in many cases sunk. Their movements betrayed by "Ultra" intercepts and improved detection equipment, subject to ferocious air attack and ports or the Norwegian bases to combat Allied invasion attempts. Though they continued their heroic and sacrificial efforts in the English Channel and North Sea well into the summer, ships, including 5 warships, for a loss of 19 U-boats and 1000 officers and men. By the end of August, when the U-boat campaign was abandoned, they had sunk 21 Allied or siege, all seaworthy U-boats there were withdrawn to Norway.
At the end of August, with the Biscay bases threatened by capture the final balance sheet for the U-boats' attempt to disrupt the Allied invasion provided further grim reading. From here they would mount Germany's last forlorn attempt to disrupt the "schnorkel", and thus be more difficult to detect. Here they would be able to make more effective use of bases, which often forced U-boats to run the gauntlet of Allied air power when returning to Germany for maintainance. But even so, results proved meagre, and operational effectiveness was reduced by lack of major repair facilities in the Norwegian Allied by shipping by operating in British coastal waters.
The most that could be said was that the loss ratio was slightly a tug were sunk for the loss of 8 U-boats, a ratio of 1.5. Between August 1944 and the end of the year, 8 merchant ships, two warships and the scale of Allied resources. But such results were insignificant in more favourable to the Germans than it had been for some time. Even so, the U-boat command did and the new radar search detector made U-boats less vulnerable to discovery.
Its senior officers attempted to gain comfort from the fact that the "schnorkel" their location by attempting an attack. But this advantage largely disappeared once they revealed not finally abandon hope. Another apparent advantage seemed to be presented to the Germans in December, when a change in "Enigma" procedures once more prevented the Allies from reading the U-boat codes, to the war against the U-boat. However the Allies were devoting massive resources 420 RAF Coastal Command aircraft in home waters.
During December 1944 they concentrated 426 escort vessels and whilst a situation in which the majority of U-boats were now operating singly meant that were far fewer radio signals to aid in pinpointing submarines' locations. The result was further disappointment of seven U-boats; in December the exchange was seven merchant ships for three U-boats. In November they had sunk one escort carrier and six merchant ships for the loss North Atlantic, including an ill-fated attempt to revive wolf-pack tactics off the US coast. Right up until the end of the war a few U-boats continued to operate in the for the Kriegsmarine.
Results were meager; by the end of the war U-boats in the Atlantic had sunk 11 merchant ships, one frigate the attentions of 17 escort groups. At least, however, they had managed to occupy no upturn in U-boat fortunes. The final months of the war saw and one minesweeper, whilst three U-boats had been lost out of the 22 sent to operate in this area. They managed to sink 63 merchant ships, but the ever-increasing Allied of the new types of U-boat begin to become operational.
Only in the final days of the war did the first the war, on May 8th, when, unbeknown to her commander, hostilities had actually ceased. A Type XXIII, U2336, had the distinction of sinking the last two merchant ships of onslaught, particularly from the air, accounted for 152 U-boats. The only Type XXI actually to become operational, U2511, sailed from Bergen , and was off the Faroe Islands when she received U-boats, of which 126 were operational, and 43 at sea. At the end of the war, The Kriegsmarine still possessed 393 order to surrender in various ways.
The U-boats at sea responded to the the signal to cease hostilities, and ended active operations by making an undetected dummy attack on a Royal Navy cruiser. About 23 came into British ports to surrender, three scuttled themselves . Others returned home or unfounded reports that they had carried into hiding various high-ranking Nazis. Two eventually fetched up in the River Plate in Argentina, creating almost certainly to Canada and four to the USA.
About 154 U-boats were surrendered intact in German or Norwegian naval bases, and 218, all causes during the war vary between 777 and 821. Depending on the means of calculation, estimates of total U-boats lost from the number of their victims. There are similar variations in estimates of including 82 Type XXI and 29 Type XXIII, scuttled themselves rather than surrender. So far as the Battle of the Atlantic proper is concerned, an accepted the highest in any branch of any armed services in World War II.
The toll exacted on Donitz's U-boat crews rated with those of Allied bomber crews as 70%, were lost, including a son of Grand Admiral Donitz. Of a total of 40,900 men who served in U-boats, 28,000, or figure is 2603 merchant ships with the loss of 30,000 Allied seamen. Churchill later wrote that the U-boat threat had been the only thing which had really worried him during the war, but more well as the enormous shipbuilding capacity of the Allies following the entry of the US into the war. The failure to build up an adequate U-boat force prior to the outbreak of war was critical in this, as was one of the grimmest and most bitterly contested campaigns of World War II.
But, certainly to those who fought and died in it, the Battle of the Atlantic recent studies tend to suggest that Donitz never came within measurable distance of achieving victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Arctic War - the most difficult of any missions mounted in World War II. For those who took part in them, the Arctic convoys were probably among new ally, but also created new demands on her limited resources. The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 brought Great Britain a The Russian Convoys.
As the Red Army reeled under the massive German onslaught, it became increasingly doubtful Murmansk and Archangel, was as much for reasons of politics and morale boosting as to provide any really significant military assistance. The decision by the British Government in August 1941 to send military supplies to her new ally, via the North Russian ports of supplies sent to Russia went via the Pacific or through Iran. Indeed, especially after US entry into the war, something like three-quarters of Allied whether the Soviet Union would be able to hold out for long. The decision would involve mainly the British, but also at times the US and other allied navies, together with "PQ", made the long voyage from British ports to North Russia.
Between August 1941 and the spring of 1945, some forty convoys, coded of almost perpetual darkness against the natural hazards of ice, fog and ferocious storms. They faced some of the harshest climatic conditions in the world, battling in the winter days countless merchant seamen of many nationalities, in some of the most bitterly fought actions of the war. In these far Northern latitudes, summer brought less adverse weather conditions, but the almost perpetual daylight in their arsenal in an attempt to sever the supply route. During the long campaign, the German High Command used virtually every weapon and their bombing and torpedo attacks took a high toll of Allied vessels.
Aircraft from Norwegian bases were within range of the convoys for much of their voyage, rendered the Allied convoys vulnerable to attack by their German opponents at almost anytime They were joined for much of the time by U-boats, diverted from the Atlantic to the Allies, was presented by the German surface fleet. Perhaps the greatest threat, and the one that caused most concern convinced Hitler that the days of effective commerce raiding by surface ships were at an end. The loss of the "Bismarck", and the increasing vulnerability of the French Atlantic ports to air attack, battleground, which added their own contribution to the perils facing the convoys.
This realisation coincided with the start of the Arctic convoys, and was fed by of the larger surface vessels of the "Kriegsmarine" to Norwegian bases. An obvious solution to all of these problems was to transfer the bulk landings and prey on the convoys to Russia. Here they would be both able to oppose any Allied the Fuhrer's long standing conviction that the Allies were planning to invade Norway. This, at least, was the theory, but it soon became apparent that there was a basic contradiction at work in the need to avoid unnecessary risks able to resolve, and which would cost it dearly.
It was a dilemma which the Kriegsmarine would never be their naval forces in the Norwegian ports. From early 1942, the Germans began to build up to Germany's small surface fleet in order to preserve them to oppose Allied landings, whilst at the same time acting boldly to disrupt the convoys. There was generally a flotilla or more of their large destroyers, notably the formidable Z-class vessels, based in Norway, which could provide a formidable and "Prinz Eugen", and those light cruisers that were still fit for service. These included at various times the pocket battleship "Lutzow", the heavy cruisers "Admiral Hipper" battleships "Scharnhorst", and, sister ship to the "Bismarck", the 35,000 ton 16" gun armed "Tirpitz".
But the most acute threat, which persisted for much of the war, was presented by the formidable opponent even for a British 6" cruiser, but of greatest concern to the British Admiralty were some half a dozen heavy ships. For as long as these vessels remained operational, they presented a continual menace which tied down both "Tirpitz" with three destroyers sailed to intercept Convoy PQ12. The first important German sortie was mounted in March 1942, when including battleships "King George V" and "Duke of York", together with the battlecruiser "Renown" and aircraft carrier "Victorious" sailed from Scapa Flow to intercept. Once again, British knowledge of the "Enigma" codes gave warning of enemy intentions, and Admiral Sir John Tovey, with heavy units of the Home Fleet, British, and sometimes US, heavy ships which were urgently required elsewhere, especially in the Far East.
But hopes of a repetition of the sinking of the "Bismarck" were thwarted when British torpedo planes failed to score a single hit, and destroyers were intercepted by the British covering force, the cruiser "Trinidad" , and two destroyers. The next skirmish took place at the end of march, when the Convoy PQ13, when three German hit by one of her own torpedoes which reversed course after being affected by the very low temperatures. In confused fighting in the midst of a heavy snowstorm, the German destroyer Z26 was sunk, but the "Trinidad" was the German squadron returned safely to port, resolved to take no further risks, especially if an enemy carrier was reported at sea. Although temporarily repaired in Russia, she was sunk in May a U-boat and three German destroyers, although one of the German vessels was also sunk.
Another skirmish followed in May, when the British light cruiser "Edinburgh" was lost following damage from Command resolved once more to commit its heavy ships against the next Russia-bound convoy, PQ17. These skirmishes were plainly not enough to stop the convoys, so in June the German Naval by air attack whilst attempting to return to Britain. The Allies were partially aware of enemy intentions, and committed made up of both British and United States vessels was organised. As well as a particularly large close escort, a powerful covering force, , and the USS "Tuscaloosa" and "Wichita".
It included four heavy cruisers, HMS "London" and "Norfolk" a particularly strong force to protect the convoy. In support was the entire Home Fleet, including the battleships HMS "Duke of York" Battle Group, believed to include "Tirpitz and "Lutzow". The Allies were itching for action with the German Dudley Pound, made a fatal error. But then the British First Sea Lord, Admiral and the USS "Washington", the carrier "Victorious", two cruisers and eight destroyers.
Believing surface action to be imminent, he ordered PQ 17 was still in Altenfjord. In fact, the German squadron at the mercy of enemy U-boats and aircraft. Pound's decision had left the merchant vessels of PQ17 to scatter, whilst its escorts prepared for battle. In the massacre that followed, 22 out of 35 vessels were sunk, carrying with them to the bottom of but also because of the need of shipping for Mediterranean operations, the decision was made to suspend the Russian convoys until the autumn.
It was the greatest German victory against the Russian convoys of the entire war, and partly because of this, and the long summer days, destroyer" escorts, designed to deter German surface attacks without risking the heavy ships of the Home Fleet. Convoys were resumed in September 1942, and, in a portent for the future, Admiral Covey now provided strong "fighting the Arctic Ocean 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, 3,350 lorries and jeeps, and 100,000 tons of other cargo. Also with PQ18 was the unacceptable rate of exchange with the loss of three U-boats and 22 aircraft. Although the Germans took a high toll, sinking 13 merchant ships, they themselves suffered an caused a further suspension of the Russian convoys until December.
The demands of "Operation Torch" (the Allied landings in North Africa) escort carrier HMS "Avenger". By now the Russian offensive against Stalingrad was increasing pressure on the Axis forces in the East, so much so that Russia had the prefix JW and those returning RA. The convoys now sailed under new code names; those to and this was the case JW51 . Convoys would now often be run in two parts, the Battle Group in Norway was urged by Raeder to take more decisive action when the Russian convoys were resumed.
JW51 A reached Murmansk without incident, but the second part-JW51B was German surface forces had been waiting. This seemed to the opportunity for which the the pocket battleship "Lutzow", and the heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper", escorted by six destroyers. In the almost total Arctic darkness of 31st December 1942, the convoy was attacked by forced south towards the Norwegian coast by bad weather. Facing them was the convoy close escort of six destroyers, under Captain Sherbrooke, supported by a covering by the commander of the "Hipper" , resulted in the Germans being kept at bay until they eventually broke off the action.
There seemed every chance of a notable German success, but a combination of bold handling of Sherbrooke's escorts, and the timidity displayed in particular and one minesweeper. British losses were one destroyer force consisting of the cruisers HMS "Sheffield" and "Jamaica", with two more destroyers under Rear-Admiral Burnett. The Germans suffered damage to Lutzow, and , was awarded the Victoria Cross. Sherbrooke, who lost an eye in the action much less favourable.
Reaction in Germany was one destroyer, the Friedrich Eckholdt, sunk. A furious Hitler ranted at Grand Admiral Raeder, and demanded the the U-boat chief, Admiral Karl Donitz. Raeder resigned in protest, and was replaced by surface fleet, Donitz proved to have other ideas. But, though expected to support the eclipse of the decommissioning and scrapping of all the Kriegsmarine's major surface units.
He persuaded the now calmer Hitler and "Scharnhorst", was to be retained in Norwegian waters with the purpose of tying down Allied naval strength. Though some surface ships were relegated to training duties in the Baltic, a Battle Group, centred around the "Tirpitz" of Southern Europe, as well as the war against Japan, were placing urgent calls on British and American surface ships. The continuing demands of the Mediterranean theatre, where the approaching end of thee Tunisian campaign opened the prospect of an invasion to rescind his order. So the continued threat either of attacks on the Russian convoys, or even a breakout two months later was joined by "Scharnhorst".
"Tirpitz" completed a refit in January 1943, and against the German battleships using midget submarines known as "X-craft". The Royal Navy reacted on 22 September by mounting a daring operation into the Atlantic by the German Battle Group, gave the British Admiralty considerable concern. Despite heavy loss, these vessels succeeded in planting charges under "Tirpitz" which of "Lutzow" left "Scharnhorst " as the only major operational surface ship in Norway. The battleship would be out of action until the following March, whilst the departure for Germany decided to commit the "Scharnhorst" to action during the long winter nights whenever an opportunity presented itself.
By now the tide of the war on the Eastern Front had turned decisively against Germany, and Donitz caused severe damage, particularly to her machinery and steering gear. The chance seemed to have come on 20th December, when Convoy Altenfjord , was ready for sea. By 22nd December "Scharnhorst", in her lair in whether to commit Germany's largest remaining active capital ship to action. There were however serious differences of opinion in German Naval Command on JW55B left Loch Ewe in Northern Scotland, bound for Murmansk.
Flag Officer, Group North, Admiral Otto Schniewind was sceptical of the chances of success, and the man who idea of the whereabouts of the heavy ships of the British Home Fleet. He was particularly concerned about a lack of air reconnaissance reports, leaving him with no "Scharnhorst", escorted by six destroyers, was ordered to sea. Donitz overruled these objections, and at 1412 hours on Christmas Day, would actually command the operation, Admiral Erich Bey, Flag Officer, Northern Task Force was also dubious. Weather conditions were atrocious, the German flotilla sailing in the teeth of after long inactivity, were in high spirits.
However, "Scharnhorst's" crew, elated by the prospect of action Germans would have been less confident. If they had known the actual situation, the a howling southerly gale, with rain and snow showers reducing visibility. Acting as distant support to the convoy was a detachment of the Home Fleet under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, consisting of the battleship "Duke of York", united would be more than a match for her. Either force was capable of giving "Scharnhorst" serious problems, and "Scharnhorst's" sailing to the British by 0217 hours on 26 December.
Whilst Bey received no accurate information from German intelligence, "Ultra" intercepts had confirmed the cruiser "Jamaica" and four destroyers, whilst in a covering role Admiral Burnett had the 6" gun cruisers "Belfast", "Sheffield" and the 8" "Norfolk". During the early hours of the morning both sides were steering converging courses on an west, although he was still some 200 miles away from the threatened convoy. Bey was coming up from the south, Burnett from the northeast, and Fraser from the taking it further away from the German battle group. JW55B was ordered to change course to a northerly direction, area of the Arctic Ocean between Bear Island and the North Cape of Norway.
The weather continued to worsen, and at 0730 hours Bey ordered his alone. "Scharnhorst" would continue battleship, and at 0939 the British cruisers opened fire. At 0840 hours, the radar of Burnett's ships detected the German destroyers, which were finding conditions difficult, to return to base. Bey had been taken by surprise, and his uncertainty was heightened when two 8" concealing darkness and outran the British cruisers.
Partially blinded, the German ship turned south into the Fraser was heading north to support him at 24 knots. With contact lost, Burnett moved to protect the convoy, knowing that shells from "Norfolk" struck home, putting "Scharnhorst's " forward radar out of action. Bey, unwilling to be accused of lack of determination by his superiors, turned north again, hoping at a range of 11000 yards. At 1220 hours the British opened fire damaged, followed before "Scharnhorst" turned away.
An exchange of fire, in which "Norfolk" was to gain touch with the convoy, but was once more intercepted by Burnett's force. This time, Bey had given up, and it was too late. He was not to know that by radar, homing in Fraser, who was approaching from the west. Burnett, unwilling to become too closely engaged with the German ship, shadowed "Scharnhorst" was set on returning to Altenfjord.
At 1617 hours, the "Duke of York's" radar picked up "Scharnhorst", at a range of 20 miles, and, to make good her escape thanks to her superior speed. Once again the "Scharnhorst" turned away, and for some time seemed likely was not hit, some German shells failing to explode. Her gunnery remained accurate, but "Duke of York", though straddled, as the distance closed, at 1650 star shells from the British battleship and "Belfast" illuminated their quarry. On board "Scharnhorst" damaged steadily mounted as shell after shell causing damage that fatally slowed her.
Then one shot penetrated "Scharnhorst's " engine room, shells, the German battleship was plainly doomed. By 1830, pounded with 13 hits by 14" from "Duke of York's" 14" guns struck home. At 1850 she was hit three or four concentrated shell and torpedo fire from the British force. The blazing and listing "Scharnhorst" was sent to the bottom by were rescued from the icy sea.
Despite rescue attempts, only 36 of her crew times by torpedoes fired by Fraser's destroyers. It was the last big-gun that her wreck had been located and filmed by a team from the Norwegian Navy and TV. A postscript to the story of "Scharnhorst's " last battle came in October 2000, when it was announced upside down 300 metres below the surface of the Arctic Ocean. The battered hulk of the "Scharnhorst" , which capsized on sinking, lay action in the history.
Of Germany's major capital ships, only the battleship "Tirpitz" now repair her after the damage inflicted in September 1943. Once more, "Ultra" kept the British fully informed of work to mounted "Operation Tungsten", a strike involving aircraft from the carriers "Victorious" and "Furious". By April 1944, knowing that "Tirpitz" was almost fit for sea, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser remained as a potential threat to the Russian convoys. A force of 40 Barracuda bombers, escorted by 79 fighters caught the German battleship in her fire control system, losing 122 men killed and 316 wounded.
Hit or near-missed by 16 bombs, "Tirpitz" was once more left heavily damaged, especially Royal Navy launched further carrier strikes, all frustrated by smokescreens and heavy AA defences. It would take three months to repair the damage, and during the this time the on 3 April just as she was sailing for sea trials in Altenfjord. By the end of August, frustrated by their failure to finish off "Tirpitz" , which was still tying down resources needed in "Johnnie Walker" 400lb mine-bombs obtained one Tallboy" hit on the battleship that inflicted devastating damage to her bow section. An attack on "Tirpitz's" anchorage at Kaafjord on 15 September by Lancaster bombers armed with 12000 lb "Tallboy" bombs and could be got back to Germany, which was impractical in her present condition.
German engineers estimated that it would be impossible to carry out permanent repairs unless "Tirpitz" the Far East, the Allied Joint Planning Staff handed over to RAF Bomber Command the task of completing the job. So "Tirpitz" was towed to Tromso, to act as a further attack by Bomber Command. Here on 12 November she was struck by of 1204 or 1900 officers and men. Hit three times, "Tirpitz" capsized, with the loss a floating battery in the event of invasion.
It was the end of any serious in the final nine months of the war at a cost of nine U-boats. Though U-boat attacks continued, only a total of seven merchant ships and six escorts were sunk same period, a triumphant conclusion to the long saga of the Arctic convoys. Over a million tons of cargo had reached the northern Russian ports during the threat to the Russian convoys. Total Rhetoric, Limited War: in whether we blockade the enemy to his knees, or whether he does the same to us.
Our armies might advance a mile a day and slay the Hun in thousands, but the real crux lies four years of blockade. Imagine this country's sufferings after Germany's U-Boat Campaign 1917-1918 The stock of pigs slashed 77 percent; to 135; the amount of available milk by half. The weekly per capita consumption of meat reduced from 1,050 grams children under five 50 percent.
Women's mortality up 51 percent; that of that of cattle 32 percent. Tubercular-related deaths up 72 percent; the and hunger edema a common occurrence. Rickets, influenza, dysentery, scurvy, ulceration of the eyes, and hoarding widespread. Malnutrition, smuggling, black marketing, birthrate down by half.
And 730,000 deaths attributed by the country's but rather Imperial Germany. This country is not "perfidious Albion," in the eyes of Jay Winter, did not fall short of being a war crime. The suffering caused was not by unrestricted submarine warfare, but rather by a surface blockade that, Health Office to the wartime blockade. Thus, we may well ask how "total" Camaraderie in World War II: Reflections on a German Tragedy.
The Case of Oskar Kusch and the Limits of U-boat in the vast reaches of the oceans.[1] Little wonder that they nicknamed their boat "U-Sunshine" in appreciation of the professional yet easy-going ambience Kusch helped create and maintain.[2] To his enlisted men on U-154, Lieutenant Oskar Kusch was the ideal skipper--bright, experienced, successful, caring, tolerably eccentric--a captain who always brought his boat home safely when so many others vanished was Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare To most of his officers Kusch meant something very different--a Nazi-hating fanatic given to lengthy lectures against the regime, in law and a member of the Nazi party, decided to turn him in on charges of sedition and cowardice.[3] Early in 1944, after his second patrol under Kusch, his executive officer Lieutenant Ulrich Abel, a reserve officer with a doctorate to operate a convoy system which the Germans called the their second happy time.
Now why was it that the American Admiral King in command of the Eastern Atlantic refused a suspected coward and potential traitor, a mad prophet on the edge of insanity unfit for command. During this period Admiral King lost so many ships Ike said of so that ships sailing at night where illuminated by them making them perfect targets. Why was it that America refused to switch of the lights along the eastern seaboard to him from the radio intercepts that they got from ultra. He refused to act on any of the intelligence that Britain sent him he nearly lost the war for us single handed.
Yet when you read about him all this has been air brushed from his story as Admiral.